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Abstract 
During the Sato Administration period, the Cabinet Research Office, which was an 
intelligence agency directly under the Cabinet office, commissioned many studies regarding 
the nuclear policy of Japan. This chapter introduces seventeen of them with emphasis on 
three of them which seems to have influenced the development of non-nuclear policy of the 
Sato Administration. Scholars and intellectuals like Kei Wakaizumi, Teiji Yabe, Kiichi Saeki, 
Yonosuke Nagai, and Michio Royama were involved in these studies. 
 
**This paper is an adapted and translated version of the original paper, which was presented 
at the 2017 Annual Convention of Japan Association of Political Science. It is part of the 
results of the research project “The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime and the Redefinition 
of Security Policies” at GRIPS (Project leader, Yoko IWAMA) supported by JSPS (Japan 
Society for Promotion of Science) KAKENHI Grant Nr. 17H00972. 
 
  
 
Introduction 
The Cabinet Research Office (hereafter CRO) was an intelligence agency directly under the 
Cabinet Office. It was established on April 9, 1952—on short notice before Japan’s 
independence. It was originally established as a research office for the Prime Minister’s 
Secretariat. It had a cooperative relationship with the US’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 
Right from its founding, the CRO took considerable interest in political developments in 
Communist China. Although it has been known for a while that the office conducted research 
into nuclear problems, its details remain largely unknown.1 In addition to research concerning 
Japan’s possible possession of nuclear weapons, which was conducted by political scientists 
such as Yonosuke Nagai and has been examined by previous research in Japan and abroad, this 
author has confirmed that at least 17 reports on nuclear policies were created between 1963 
and 1970. The list of 17 reports are provided at the end of this chapter. Among these reports, 
three are particularly important.  
The first is a report by international politics scholar Kei Wakaizumi, which was 
compiled immediately after China’s nuclear test in 1964. In January 1965, Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato and President Lyndon B. Johnson held a meeting of the heads of states. On this 
occasion, Sato assured that Japan would not nuclearize, and Johnson gave assurances 
concerning the American extended deterrence for Japan. It is possible that Wakaizumi’s report 
created an impetus towards this arrangement. 
The second report was compiled by political scientist Teiji Yabe in collaboration with 
Kiichi Saeki, former President, National Defense College. This report appears to convey the 
content of the two’s presentation regarding Japan’s nuclear policy during their meeting with 
Prime Minister Sato in March 1967. The report could have become the theoretical basis for the 
Sato administration's development of a non-nuclear policy, including its so-called Four Pillars 
of the Nuclear Policy.2 
The third was a study on possible nuclear weapons development by Japan compiled 
just before the signing of the NPT. The report was compiled by a group of scholars led by 
Yonosuke Nagai and Michio Royama. This could be described as a rounding up of the CRO’s 
work on nuclear weapons. The report was probably compiled to consider how best to appeal to 
Japanese public opinion to support the government’s non-nuclear policy. 
By focusing on these three commissioned studies, this paper attempts to reinterpret 
the CRO’s work on nuclear weaponry. Among other things, it relies on an extensive interview 
with Minro Shigaki, former head of the various divisions of the CRO.3 
 
The Seventeen Nuclear Weapons Policy Reports 
The CRO began to commission studies on nuclear armament in 1963, during the Ikeda 
administration. The office’s focus on nuclear armament gathered momentum following 
China’s nuclear test in 1964. Seventeen reports—counting only the reports compiled between 
1963 and 1970— were kept privately by Minro Shigaki, the head of the various divisions of 
the CRO, and others (Table 1). 
  Three reports were compiled after January 1963, when US Ambassador to Japan 
Edwin O. Reischauer attempted to sound out Foreign Minister Ohira about nuclear 
submarines making port calls in Japan.4 These reports dealt with the anti-nuclear submarine 
port call movement. They were titled ‘The Background to the Anti-Nuclear Submarine Port 
Call Movement’, ‘Scholars and Cultural Figures in the Anti-Nuclear Submarine Port Call 
Movement’ and ‘The Post-War Science Movement and Progressive Scientists’ (Table 1: ① 
②③). Following China’s nuclear test in October 1964, the report entitled ‘The People’s 
Republic of China’s Nuclear Test and Japan’s Security’ (④) was also quickly put together by 
Wakaizumi. From 1965 onwards, the CRO turned its attention towards Japan's nuclear 
policy, given the changes in the international environment. ‘Various Issues Related to 
Nuclear Policy’ (⑤) and ‘Japan’s Nuclear Policy and Diplomacy: Preconditions’ (⑧) were 
compiled during this transitional period, and these reports explored the various possibilities 
for Japan’s nuclear policy. The office turned its focus towards the NPT when the latter 
emerged as a key political issue; consequently, research was focused on the peaceful use of 
nuclear power and the handling of the NPT. 
According to Shigaki, the CRO commissioned research by selecting a topic and covertly 
seeking the most appropriate specialist for the topic. It was operating completely 
independently of the Prime Minister’s Office. The selection of topics and researchers was 
done secretively and without any input from the Prime Minister’s Office. Indeed, the CRO 
took pride in not meeting politicians and in conducting research independently of any 
political influence. 
 
The First Report: The Wakaizumi Report Following China’s Nuclear Test (Table 1-④) 
On the night of October 16, 1964, the Chinese government announced that it had successfully 
tested an atomic bomb. It was the seventh day of the Tokyo Olympic Games, which had 
commenced on October 10. The Soviet Union’s Premier Nikita Khrushchev resigned from his 
position as premier, and a new administration took power in the United Kingdom. In this way 
domestic and international circumstances became fluid all of a sudden. As China became the 
fifth nuclear-armed state (the other four being the US, the Soviet Union, the UK and France), 
Prime Minister Ikeda remarked, ‘From a military perspective, this is not a big deal. Rather, the 
extent of the political and psychological influence in Asia is the problem’. Ikeda had ‘kept a 
cool eye on the situation, seeing it as ‘a matter of time’ because he had independently gathered 
‘very trustworthy information’ about the likelihood of Chinese experiment through ‘a certain 
special channel’.5 
The CRO began to commission studies immediately following China’s nuclear 
experiment. One of those chosen by Shigaki was Kei Wakaizumi, a scholar in international 
politics. Shigaki had kept an eye on Wakaizumi ever since Wakaizumi was a student at the 
Faculty of Law at the University of Tokyo and an active member of Doyokai, a study group 
of concerned students. The entries in Shigaki’s diary immediately before the nuclear test 
indicate that the CRO was aware of the imminence of the nuclear test and had begun 
preparations.6 
  Wakaizumi’s report entitled ‘The People’s Republic of China’s Nuclear Test and 
Japan’s Security: The Basic Policy Direction that Should be Taken by Our Country’ was 
dated 2 December 1964, six weeks after China’s nuclear test. The research was not carried 
out under the instruction of the Prime Minister’s Office but by the sole discretion of the CRO. 
On the front page, the author Wakaizumi’s name does not appear and one finds a stamp 
‘secret’ indicating its confidential nature. The CRO had printed two hundred copies of this 
report under the name of International Affairs Research Group (Kokusai Josei Kenkyukai), 
an incorporated association to which the CRO had commissioned research. The copies were 
distributed to the Prime Minister’s Office, among others. 
The report consisted of four parts: an introduction entitled ‘Taking the security of 
one’s country more seriously,’ ‘A criticism of unarmed neutrality and Japan’s independent 
argument on nuclear armament,’ ‘Policy direction that should be taken by our country with 
adherence to the Japan–US Security Alliance as a precondition,’ and a conclusion. In the 
introduction, the author views the advanced level of China’s nuclear test as a serious problem 
for Japan. He expresses hope that Japan would not merely condemn China’s test but also 
seriously consider its own security. It urges reflection on the ‘economy first’ attitude of post-
war Japanese political trend and asks whether something more essential and important has 
not been missing. Borrowing the words of an American journalist, he criticises it as 
‘prosperity without a soul.’ Wakaizumi later commented in his memoirs, The Best Course 
Available: A Personal Account of the Secret US–Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations, that 
Japan, during the latter half of the twentieth century, was a ‘fools’ paradise’ absorbed in the 
materialist worship of money.7 
  The report then discusses some concrete measures, critically examining both the 
Socialist Party of Japan’s argument on demilitarized neutrality. Demilitarized neutrality 
policies and the abandonment of the US–Japan Security Treaty are referred to as an 
irresponsible abstract argument, absolutely non-executable under the fluid, deteriorating 
international situation surrounding Japan. Furthermore, it rejects the possibility of 
establishing a US–USSR–China–Japan security treaty, as well as the possibility of 
establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in the Asia-Pacific that would include these four 
countries; it regards these as unrealistic, empty slogans. The report anticipates that mental 
intimidation will increase with the advancement of China’s nuclear armament and that those 
feeling insecure will become proponents of the abrogation of Japan’s security treaty with the 
US and to get rid of US military bases in Japan because they would invite Chinese hostility. 
The report expects these people to call for the early restoration of Japan–China diplomatic 
relations as well as China’s entry into the UN. The report argues that what is necessary for 
Japan at this stage is to have a realistic and critical perception about the state of things in 
China. It explains that China is a latent threat to Japan and other neighbouring countries, and 
against claims that Japan would be safe if it merely gave up its security alliance with the US 
in favour of a neutral policy, it points out that India, which had adopted a non-alignment 
policy and had been in a friendly relationship with China, was nonetheless invaded by China 
in 1962. 
  The report then admits that there are views in Japan that it should arm itself with 
nuclear weapons, now that China has its own nuclear weapons. The report attributes this 
argument to concerns about the reliability of security assurances of the Japan–US Security 
Treaty (the nuclear umbrella) when China pursues nuclear armament by developing hydrogen 
bombs and the rockets to carry them. Wakaizumi expresses his agreement by making 
reference to General Pierre Marie Gallois of France who stated something similar in an 
interview with a Japanese journalist.8 Wakaizumi recognised the logical validity of calling 
for Japan’s nuclear armament; however, he maintained that in purely military and strategic 
terms, to counter China and the USSR on its own, Japan would have to acquire a massive, 
effective and invulnerable nuclear armament, which, from a financial perspective, was 
impossible.  
Wakaizumi also argued that the nuclear armament of Japan may not be feasible as a 
policy, given the majority national sentiment, Japan’s political situation and its constitution 
and the terms of the Atomic Energy Basic Act. He concluded that if Japan were to push 
forward on its own nuclear armament plan, it would meet strong opposition from the US, and 
it was also undesirable from a non-proliferation perspective. 
  Wakaizumi asserts that it was impossible for a country to protect itself on its own in 
the nuclear age and that regional collective defence was the most common practice. In 
Japan’s case, this meant strengthening and developing national policy based on the Japan–US 
Security Treaty. It was important to communicate to the public that the Treaty serves as the 
basis for Japan’s defence precisely because the values and the objectives of Japan and the US 
were fundamentally identical. In comparison, the values and the objectives of Communist 
China were fundamentally different from those of Japan.  
Wakaizumi proposes a division of roles with the US. That is, he proposes that Japan rely on 
the US for nuclear deterrence and at the same time increase its conventional armament for 
self-defence purposes, thereby reducing the burden on the US. He emphasises that it is 
important for Japan to acquire secure confirmation of the US’s nuclear umbrella to protect 
itself from China’s nuclear threat. While he regards President Johnson's promise of security 
in case of threat by nuclear weapons as authentic, he nonetheless notes that it might be 
necessary to arrive at a more concrete agreement in the future. Wakaizumi also states that it is 
only natural for Japan to perform its duties as an ally, such as allowing nuclear submarines to 
make port calls in Japan. In the future, other measures to gain American commitment of 
retaliatory power to Japan’s defence may become necessary, such as the port calls of the 
Polaris nuclear submarines. 
  Wakaizumi concludes that while Japan should not consider nuclear armament to be a 
national policy, it should nonetheless retain the latent ability for a time when nuclear 
armament becomes unavoidable. In other words, Japan should always retain higher standards 
when compared with China in terms of scientific and technical standards, as well as industrial 
infrastructure and other national potentials concerning these aspects. To demonstrate Japan’s 
capacity, Wakaizumi proposes to prioritise measures such as the peaceful use of nuclear 
energy, the launching of satellites via domestically made rockets and so on.  
 
Wakaizumi’s report was given in early December of 1964. In January 1965, Prime Minister 
Eisaku Sato visited the US and met President Johnson for the first time. One of the first 
things that President Johnson did was to reconfirm the American commitment for the security 
of Japan—with nuclear weapons, if necessary. It is hard to think that Sato’s views were not 
influenced by reading Wakaizumi’s report.9 
 
The Second Document: Yabe and Saeki’s Advice for the Prime Minister (Table 1-⑦) 
In February 1966, the CRO requested Teiji Yabe to assume leadership of the International 
Affairs Research Group, which Yabe gladly accepted. Yabe was a political scientist, who, 
before World War II, was involved in Fumimaro Konoe’s national policy research organisation 
called ‘Showa Kenkyukai.’ After the war, Yabe had served as the President of Takushoku 
University. Yabe was among those who had maintained a close relationship with the CRO since 
its founding. It is also worth mentioning that Wakaizumi, as a young student, was strongly 
influenced by Yabe and that the two had remained in close contact ever since.10 
According to Shigaki’s diary, Yabe, Kiichi Saeki (the former President, National 
Defense College) and Hideo Otsu (head of the CRO) went to meet Prime Minister Sato in his 
office on 8 March 1967. They are supposed to have made propositions about Japan’s nuclear 
policies.11 They explained the findings of the research they had conducted in the previous year. 
The report entitled ‘Issues Concerning Our Country’s Nuclear Policy’ appears to be the report 
that was handed to Sato on this day. In December 1967, Prime Minister Sato addressed a Lower 
House Budget Committee meeting of the Diet on the matter of Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear 
Principles. Shigaki thinks that this March 8 meeting greatly influenced Sato’s thinking on 
nuclear policy. 
  The report entitled ‘Issues concerning Our Country’s Nuclear Policy’ (23 February 
1967) was compiled by the International Issues Research Group (Kokusai Mondai Kenkyukai), 
an incorporated association linked to the CRO. Concerning the influence of China’s 
development of nuclear weapons, the report said that ‘insofar as can be foreseen, the overall 
influence on the strategic regime of the Far East is minimal’. However, China’s nuclear 
development could pave the way to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in turn could 
heighten the possibility of nuclear weapons being used through accident or mistakes. This 
prospect had indeed shocked the world. The most imminent issues under such circumstances 
were as follows: (1) what approach Japan should take regarding the early conclusion of the 
NPT and the complete banning of nuclear tests; and (2) the security measures that Japan should 
adopt regarding the fact that psychologically, politically and militarily, Japan was directly 
affected by China’s nuclear armament. 
Although the report states that nuclear energy ought to be used primarily for peaceful 
purposes since nuclear weapons can destroy humanity, it nonetheless acknowledges that 
nuclear weapons ‘are very important for a country’s security and are deeply related to a state’s 
authority and the weight of its voice.’ In particular, possessing an invulnerable nuclear 
capability was a means of ‘deterring a nuclear war’. The report also highlights the urgent need 
for international measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban their testing 
to reduce the risks of nuclear war because the more the countries that own nuclear weapons the 
more likely the danger of nuclear war. At the same time, the report also acknowledges the 
importance of fully considering that ‘the status of non-nuclear states does not remain powerless 
and such legitimate right of self-defence not be neglected’.  
Concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the report 
expresses the stance that Japan should ‘approach the signing of the treaty aiming to prevent 
nuclear proliferation with a cooperative attitude’. The report also states that the following 
points should be taken into consideration, given that the treaty may have a long-lasting impact 
on the country’s security. First, the treaty should not prevent the signatories from taking 
necessary measures for their security following bilateral or multilateral agreements in response 
to nuclear attacks or threats by nuclear weapons. Second, efforts should be made to ensure the 
fair distribution of duties and responsibilities between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states. Disarmament should be carried out gradually so that it does not affect the mutual 
balance. Third, non-nuclear weapon states should also be allowed to engage in research and 
development for peaceful use of nuclear energy. Fourth, follow-up meetings should be 
convened periodically to examine the provisions and the implementation of the treaty. 
Regarding the banning of nuclear testing, the report suggests that Japan should 
‘continue to seek the complete banning of nuclear weapons tests’ and that the ban should be 
accompanied by ‘international control including on-the-spot inspections’. 
Regarding Japan’s defence, it expresses the view that first, it would be impossible for 
Japan to counter the nuclear arsenals of superpowers such as the Soviet Union by its own 
nuclear arsenal and that ‘it is imperative that we rely on the nuclear deterrence capabilities of 
the US’. Second, it predicts that China ‘will complete in two to three years the deployment of 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could launch effective nuclear attacks’ on its 
neighbouring countries and that ‘the intercontinental ballistic missiles will be deployed in 
seven or eight years’. In any case, it was necessary to respond to the progress of Chinese nuclear 
armament step by step. It was primarily necessary not to give in to China’s threats and maintain 
the national power to stand up to China and be counted as an equal. The report proposes the 
following as prospective security measures: 
First, it calls for the prolongation of the Japan–US security regime, and it also 
highlights the need to make full use of US nuclear deterrence. More accurately, the report states 
the following: (a) Make communication between the Japanese and American heads of state 
more effective, (b) participate in discussions regarding the deployment and management of the 
US nuclear force and (c) review former policies in order to prepare for the need for the 
introduction of US nuclear weapons. Second, it highlights the importance of addressing the 
Japanese public’s aversion to nuclear weapons. Third, it suggests that Japan should not engage 
in nuclear armament independently; doing so, the report argues, might be interpreted as an 
expression of lack of trust towards US deterrence capability vis-à-vis China, and lead to the 
undermining of US-Japan Security Treaty.  
Unfortunately, this author has not been able to acquire all the pages of this report. 
Only the first seven pages were left in the holdings of Mr. Yoshihara.12 It is also difficult to 
prove that this meeting on 8 March 1967 between PM Sato, Yabe and Saeki led directly to the 
development of the three non-nuclear principles nine months later. However, this report can 
nonetheless be viewed as representing the views of a large number of experts who had close 
ties with the administration. And Yabe and Saeki were very important figures in the 
surroundings of Prime Minister Sato. 
 
The Third Report: The Nuclear Development Research of Nagai and Royama (Table 1-⑪,⑯) 
In January 1968, the CRO embarked on full-fledged research about nuclear policy. Yonosuke 
Nagai, Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology, and a political science scholar, played a 
central role in this context. Nagai had first engaged in research on political awareness and 
behaviour. However, during his tenure as Visiting Professor at Harvard University, the Cuban 
Missile Crisis escalated (October 1962), and Nagai turned his focus towards international 
politics consequently. A study group was formed in Japan following Nagai’s return to the 
country. As per Shigaki’s account, Nagai had first approached Kakihana Hidetake, Professor, 
Tokyo Institute of Technology, and a nuclear chemist, who would later serve as the IAEA’s 
Deputy Director General. Kakihana, in turn, was believed to have invited Maeda Hisashi, a 
journalist well-versed in disarmament issues, to the study group. Following these 
developments, Nagai invited Royama Michio to the study group as well. Royama was a 
scholar of international politics and the youngest of the four; he would later serve as a 
representative of the National Council for the Normalisation of Japan–China Diplomatic 
Relations (Nicchu Koko Seijoka Kokumin Kyogi-kai). Their research group was named ‘Ka-
na-ma-ro Society’ (Kanamaro-kai)—a combination of the first characters of the family name 
of each of them- Kakihana, Nagai, Maeda, and Royama. The study group held its first 
meeting on January 30, 1968. This also happened to be an important day for the Sato 
administration. In a party discussion involving its representatives in the Lower House, Sato 
elaborated on the four pillars of Japan's nuclear policy (the three non-nuclear principles, the 
promotion of nuclear disarmament, reliance on the US’s nuclear deterrence capabilities and 
the peaceful use of nuclear power). Following discussions about the three non-nuclear 
principles at a Lower House Budget Committee meeting in December of the previous year, 
the Sato administration's non-nuclear policy was extensively debated in the Diet. 
The Kanamaro Society met every month, sometimes more frequently, until 21 
February 1969; members usually met at the International House of Japan in Roppongi, in 
which Royama was the head of the research office. Based on Shigaki's journal entries, the 
group met approximately 16 times, including a field seminar in the mountain resort of 
Karuizawa from 12 to 13 July 1968. There were many distinguished guests at their meetings, 
including Okamoto Tetsushi, a pioneer in Japanese rocket engineering; Imai Ryukichi, who 
was involved with the Japan Atomic Power Company before serving as the ambassador of 
Japan’s delegation to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament; Sekino Hideo, a military 
affairs commentator; Kosaka Masataka, an international politics scholar; and Suzuki Tatsuzo, 
who was from The Institute of Statistical Mathematics. 
  Following discussions that spanned eight months, the group authored a report 
entitled ‘Basic Research on Japan’s Nuclear Policy (Part 1): The Technological, 
Organizational, and Financial Possibilities of Establishing an Independent Nuclear Force’  
in September 1968. ‘Basic Research on Japan's Nuclear Policy (Part 2): The Strategic, 
Diplomatic, and Political Issues of an Independent Nuclear Force’  was completed in 
January 1970. According to Shigaki, the first volume was authored primarily by Kakihana 
and the second by Royama.  
In the Foreword to the first volume, the following are listed as the aims of the 
research:  
(1) To provide basic data and analyses to help establish a comprehensive nuclear 
policy for Japan 
(2) To establish the current state of nuclear related capabilities of Japan (including 
the situation in the near future) in order to think about the hypothetical nuclear weapons 
capability of Japan 
(3) Given the fact that Japan is prohibited from engaging in nuclear experiments, 
including underground ones, by the Partial Test Ban Treaty, and by participating in the NPT, 
Japan will definitely go the road of a non-nuclear state 
(4) To facilitate the independent development of peaceful use of nuclear power and 
to prevent nuclear power from being used for military purposes 
In other words, with the NPT negotiations in mind, the Kanamaro Society aimed to 
create a report to help establish Japan’s nuclear policy. The existence of this report was 
revealed to the wider public in November 1994 by Asahi Shimbun.13 The report was also 
cited in a couple of academic articles, and even overseas, it came to be known as a major 
work of Japanese research on nuclear armament.14 
 
Part I (Table 1-⑪) 
The main text of Part I of the report is divided thematically into six chapters: the 
problems associated with the manufacture of nuclear bombs, the manufacture of fissile 
material, the state of rocket technology development, the state of the development of 
guidance systems, human/organisation-related aspects, and financial issues. Following is the 
summary of its contents: 
 
(A) Problems associated with the manufacture of the nuclear bombs 
To manufacture nuclear bombs, Japan would have to rely on plutonium as the country 
lacked the capacity to produce enriched uranium. Approximately 100 kilograms of 
plutonium were potentially accumulated in the nuclear waste on an annual basis in the 
nuclear reactors in the villages of Tokai; the reactors, however, were under the regulations 
of IAEA. Japan, therefore, did not have unfettered access to the raw materials or the 
devices necessary to manufacture nuclear weapons. Even if Japan ignored the terms and 
restrictions imposed by the IAEA, it would have had to reprocess plutonium so that it could 
be used in the manufacture of nuclear bombs. There were plans to construct a reprocessing 
plant by 1972, but currently Japan would not be able to possess the capacity to manufacture 
nuclear weapons with plutonium. A plutonium bomb, moreover, required that it be 
triggered via implosion, and it was necessary to conduct at least four experiments before 
the bomb could be developed for use. Based on the rate at which other developed nuclear 
states manufactured their nuclear weapons, it was estimated that Japan would require 6 
years to manufacture a bomb. 
(B) Problems related to the manufacture of fissile materials 
It was expected that by mid to late-1970s, nuclear power would contribute substantially to 
the world’s energy production. A light-water reactor using enriched uranium was the best 
choice both from technological and economical point of view. The US and the Soviet 
Union maintained a monopoly over the production of enriched uranium, and there was 
danger that Japan would have to import uranium from the US. Japan, therefore, needed to 
consider methods of producing its own enriched uranium even if only in small amounts. 
Seen from a nuclear energy business point of view, it was also desirable to possess 
capability to produce enriched uranium. It was expected that by 1975, the market for 
enriched uranium would change from a buyers’ market to a sellers’ market. Therefore, 
Japan intended to initiate basic research on enriched uranium by 1975 to be able to 
construct enriched uranium manufacturing plants by the mid-1980s.There were three ways 
to manufacture enriched uranium: gaseous diffusion, centrifugal separation and 
development of new technology. The gaseous diffusion method was not suitable to Japan 
given the high electricity costs involved in the production. Centrifugal separation was 
facing technological problems. But new technological developments were possible. The 
construction of an enriched uranium manufacturing plant was regarded as an ‘issue that the 
country should seriously address from the perspective of ‘economic national defence’.  
(C) Problems related to the propulsion and guidance of missiles 
Solid fuel of the level of those used by the Polaris missile is technologically feasible for 
Japan. However, the manufacture of Polaris-level rockets was difficult due to the high costs 
of production. Substantial time would be needed to establish a high-volume production 
system to operate at low costs. In addition, without a development of a guidance system, a 
military rocket with a nuclear warhead would not be completed. It was impossible to know 
how much time would be needed to develop a guidance system for medium-range ballistic 
missiles (MRBM) and IRBMs. With the small number of engineers available and very little 
basic knowledge, this would most probably require at least 8 years. 
(D) Human, organisational and financial aspects 
Building national consensus for the establishment of a nuclear force was a very difficult 
task. Even if the government decides on the establishment of a nuclear force, it would be 
very difficult to achieve a consensus of the engineers related for the project. Moreover, 
state-level projects of this scale would put huge financial pressure on the state budget. The 
costs of securing the ‘modest nuclear force’ (using UN Secretary General U Thant’s 
classification) were estimated to average 61.2 billion yen per year for 10 years. In contrast, 
the costs of securing a ‘small-scale, high-performance nuclear force’ were estimated to 
average 201.6 billion yen per year for 10 years. 
(E) Conclusion 
Simply manufacturing a small number of plutonium bombs would be possible and 
relatively easy. But establishing a meaningful nuclear force faces the above-mentioned 
mountains of problems. It was not possible at this time to give a final answer to whether 
Japan should or should not establish its independent nuclear force. It required further 
strategic, national-psychological and diplomatic consideration. 
 
Part 2 (Table 1-⑯) 
The report’s second part covers the following problems; 
(A) The nuclear threat posed by China 
Given China’s alleged progress in its efforts to develop a compact and light hydrogen 
bomb as well as a long-range missile, it was highly likely that China would have the 
capacity to directly attack the US in the 1970s. China would be capable of attacking Japan 
even earlier. China's possible aims for continuing the development of ICBM were: (1) 
obtain capacity to deter the US, the Soviet Union, or both; (2) gain the ability to conduct 
nuclear attacks on surrounding regions (including Japan) using IRBMs and thereby limit 
the possibility military interventions of the US and the Soviet Union in these regions; (3) 
acquire the ability to threaten neighbouring countries with nuclear weapons to carry out 
people’s liberation war, while deterring nuclear attacks from the US and the Soviet Union; 
(4) use the development to heighten national prestige and inspire the people of China and 
the allies of China; (5) to entangle Soviet Union in its defensive war against the US 
From the perspective of Japan's security and nuclear policy, (2) was regarded as the 
most dangerous. “Nuclear blackmail” from the Chinese side may lead to the loss of 
credibility of the American ‘nuclear umbrella. In Europe, concerns emerged about the 
effectiveness of the US’s nuclear umbrella when the Soviet Union developed nuclear 
missiles with the range to target the US mainland. Consequently, France militarily 
withdrew from the NATO and established its own nuclear force. China probably decided to 
develop its independent nuclear force for the same reason. Should Japan also decide to 
acquire nuclear weapons by the time Chinese nuclear missiles reaches American mainland? 
(B) The nuclear strategy-related issues faced by Japan 
 Given that Japan’s population was 3.6 times more concentrated than that of China, and 
that 50.1% of Japan’s population and major industrial facilities were concentrated in the 
Tokaido megalopolis region(as of October 1968), Japan cannot tolerate even a single 
hydrogen bomb to reach this territory. Even the US has not succeeded in developing an 
effective antiballistic missile (ABM) system, so this was also not reliable.  
(C) Nuclear armament and political/diplomatic issues 
France seemed to offer one example to consider the choices before Japan. But it was also 
necessary to evaluate France’s nuclear armament from multiple perspectives. In 
considering Japan’s nuclear armament, it must be taken into account that unlike Europe, 
Asia was not comprised of homogeneous countries (homogeneity in terms of culture, 
history, or economy). Furthermore, unlike France, for whom it was only the Soviet Union 
that posed a nuclear threat, Japan had two nuclear threats (the Soviet Union and China). 
Moreover, the situation in Asia was such that the Korean War and the Vietnam War could 
not be prevented despite American nuclear deterrence efforts. Furthermore, while France’s 
nuclear armament did not threaten the NATO member states, Japan’s nuclear armament 
would certainly alert China and raise the suspicions of both US and Soviet Union. An 
indispensable condition for stable nuclear deterrence is the maintenance of channels of 
communication between enemies. The ‘hotline’ between the US and the Soviet Union 
following the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis is an example in this regard. However, there were 
no diplomatic relations between Japan and China, and the dispute between Japan and the 
Soviet Union regarding the Northern Territories (Kuril Islands) did not appear to be 
resolvable. Diplomatic conditions surrounding Japan were so unfavourable that it is not 
hard to imagine that Japan’s decision to arm itself with nuclear force would heighten 
political instability in and out of the country.  
(D) Conclusion 
Based on the above analysis, it can be said that Japan’s nuclear armament would not 
highten its security. Since Japan had also joined the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, its 
efforts at developing nuclear warheads had to be based solely on underground tests. At the 
moment, even this seemed unlikely. Japan’s withdrawal from the treaty would aggravate 
international tension. Given also the NPT’s formation and Japan’s participation in it, Japan 
could not acquire nuclear warheads from other countries. In other words, Japan could not 
possess nuclear weapons given the difficulties it faced on the technological, diplomatic and 
political fronts. However, the fact that Japan cannot arm itself with nuclear weapons did 
not necessarily mean diminishing Japanese security. Nationalist sentiments may be 
temporarily satisfied by the attainment of nuclear weapons, but this effect would not last 
long, and the possession of these weapons would probably place Japan in an even more 
difficult situation. The time when the possession of nuclear weapons was a condition for a 
Great Power was passed. Japan's security issues needed to be solved from a completely 
new and multidimensional perspective. 
 
Kanamaro Society’s Report can be seen as a grand compilation of the various nuclear policies 
that the CRO had considered. As mentioned earlier, the existence of the report gained fame 
after the report of Asahi Shimbun on November 13, 1994. Ever since, there have been an 
assumption that this report was an indication of the Japanese government’s ‘secret’ research 
on nuclear armament. But this author believes that this was a very misleading impression given 
by the Asahi Shimbun, and that in reality the report was not secret at all. 
  Shigaki Minro, who was in charge of the CRO, has stated in an interview that ‘the 
existence of the research group was not communicated to any agency or ministry besides the 
CRO, and no information was shared with the likes of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. He 
also said, ‘There was no idea of releasing the findings of the research to the public’. Shigaki 
also informed me that ‘Two hundred copies were printed and submitted to Prime Minister 
Sato and others through Secretary Kusuda’. 
In contrast, Royama’s account is slightly different; Royama says, ‘While I did not 
have any awareness that this research project was a top-secret project, the decision of the 
CRO not to release the part 1 and part 2 of the report publicly was probably because, at the 
time, it was unable to predict whether the conclusions of the research would end up 
supporting or rejecting the acquisition of a nuclear force. They refrained from publication out 
of caution.”  
 The cover of the report that does not indicate its confidentiality—it does not bear 
‘secret’ or ‘handle with care’ stamps. There are several facts which contradict these claims of 
secrecy. The second part of the report was published in Issue 173 (May 1970) of Monthly 
Research Report (an organ of the CRO); it was entitled ‘A Discussion of Japan’s Nuclear 
Policy’.15 In the article, one can find the following explanatory sentence at the very 
beginning: ‘This paper is an introduction of a commissioned research report’. While in the 
main text one finds some minimal additions and modifications, overall, it covers the same 
content, including the conclusion. At the end of the article, one finds the initials of the author, 
‘MR’ (Michio Royama). It is only natural that some researcher have come to the conclusion 
that they ‘have doubts regarding calling this a “secret report”’.16 Monthly Research Report 
was a journal that aimed to create positive publicity about the CRO within the government, 
and Shigaki had been involved with the journal since its inception. It is hard to imagine that 
Shigaki would have been completely unaware of the publication of the ‘secret’ research he 
was in charge of. 
Furthermore, part II of the report was also subsequently published as a chapter under 
the title ‘China’s Nuclear Threat and Japan’ as part of Royama’s book in the same year.17 
The content is unaltered, barring a few additions and corrections to the main text. It was 
published in March 1970, only 2 months after the second volume was put together. This 
means that he must have immediately begun the preparation for the publication of the book 
after the completion of the report. The ‘secret research’ was released simultaneously in three 
forms: as a report of the CRO submitted to the Sato administration, in the CRO’s organ 
Monthly Research Report, as well as a part of a major publishing company’s book. 
Part of the purpose of the CRO was to guide public opinion in accordance with the 
government’s views. The publication of the report seems to have been intentional, the 
purpose of which was to popularise a non-nuclear stance of Japan towards the general public 
by explaining the realities of Japan’s security environment. 
 
Conclusion 
In the 7 years and 8 months that the Sato administration was in power, during which 
negotiations about reversion of Okinawa to Japan were ongoing, the country’s non-nuclear 
policy was being drawn up. At first, it was discussed in response to changes in the 
international political climate and in the context of the US’s demands. During the Ikeda 
administration, the US had sounded out Japan about its nuclear submarines making port calls 
in the country. Three days after the Sato administration took power on 9 November 1964, the 
Seadragon became the first submarine to make a port call in Sasebo City. The Americans had 
already been informed during the Ikeda administration that there would be no objections to 
normal nuclear submarines (excluding Polaris-type ones) making port calls. 
  Sato was forced to fully address the nuclear issue because of China’s nuclear test. 
During the Sato administration, the CRO examined the pros and cons of nuclear armament. 
Between 1963 and 1970, at least 17 reports were compiled as a result of commissioned 
research on this topic. The works commissioned by the CRO were authored by top experts in 
the fields of political science, international politics, nuclear chemistry and others. They 
probably had considerable influence upon Sato’s nuclear policy of this period. 
  The involvement of scholars in nuclear policy research started during the Ikeda 
administration, and gained significant momentum during the Sato administration. The role 
played by Sato's Chief Secretary Kusuda Minoru, who, inspired by President John F. 
Kennedy’s close association with intellectuals, worked to strengthen the administration’s 
relationship with intellectuals, was significant. Sato’s trusted confidant Toshio Kimura, who 
was in charge of negotiations involving the return of Okinawa and the country’s non-nuclear 
policy, also played a significant role as an intermediary between the CRO and Sato. In the 
Cabinet, an information channel was established that stretched from Shigaki to Kusuda, 
Kimura and finally to Sato himself. In response to Sato and Kusuda’s requests, Wakaizumi 
also agreed to be closely involved with the government. Wakaizumi prepared the 
administrative policy speech during the Diet’s fifty-eighth session, which addressed life in 
the nuclear age. He also played the role of secret emissary during negotiations involving the 
reversion of Okinawa. 
  Under pressure from Chinese nuclear weapons development during the 1960s, Japan 
found its path as a non-nuclear state. Although limited by its anti-communist, pro-US 
framework, the CRO served as a hub for a group of scholars and served as an intermediary 
between the government and intellectuals by way of commissioned research. Sato 
administration’s non-nuclear policy is inherited in Japanese society and is well alive in the 
twenty-first century today. 
 
Table 1. List of Commissioned Nuclear Policy Research Reports (Created by the 
Author) 
 Title Date 
Created 
Author Creating 
Organisation 
No. of 
Pages 
①  ‘The Background to 
the Anti-Nuclear 
Submarine Port Call 
Movement: 
Specifically 
Regarding the 
Opposition 
Movement by 
Scientists’ 
May 1963 Unknown Kokumin 
Shuppan 
Kyokai 
76 
②  ‘Scholars and 
Cultural Figures in 
the Anti-Nuclear 
Submarine Port Call 
Movement’ 
July 1963 Unknown Unknown 23 
③  The Post-War Science 
Movement and 
Progressive 
‘Scientists’ 
December 
1963 
Unknown Kokumin 
Shuppan 
Kyokai 
81 
④ ‘People’s Republic of 
China’s Nuclear Test 
and Japan’s Security: 
The Basic Policy 
Direction that Should 
be Taken by Our 
Country’ 
December 
2, 1964 
Kei 
Wakaizumi 
Kokusai 
Josei 
Kenkyukai 
22 
⑤ ‘Various Issues 
Related to Nuclear 
Policy’ 
May 26, 
1965 
Kusumi 
Tadao 
Kokusai 
Josei 
Kenkyukai 
32 
⑥ ‘Our Country’s 
Nuclear Development 
Abilities’ 
 
February 
1967 
Kishida 
Junnosuke 
(Lecture) 
Kokusai 
Josei 
Kenkyukai 
12 
⑦ ‘Issues Concerning 
Our Country’s 
Nuclear Policy’ 
February 
23, 1967 
Unknown Kokusai 
Josei 
Kenkyukai 
Only the 
first 7 
pages 
intact, 
the rest 
missing 
⑧ Japan’s Nuclear 
Policy and 
Diplomacy: 
Preconditions’ 
December 
1967 
Unknown Unknown 152 
⑨ ‘The Current State of 
Nuclear Energy 
Usage for Peaceful 
Purposes: The Use of 
Radioactive Isotopes 
and Radioactive 
Waves’ 
February 
1968 
Kigoshi 
Kunihiko 
Minshushugi 
Kenkyukai 
65 
⑩ ‘Issues in Nuclear 
Power Development 
and Institutional 
Development’ 
May 1968 Unknown Genshiryoku 
Mondai 
Kenkyukai 
57 
⑪ ‘Basic Research on 
Japan’s Nuclear 
Policy (Vol. 1): The 
September 
1968 
Kanamoro 
Society 
Kakihana 
Minshushugi 
Kenkyukai 
62 
Technological, 
Organizational, and 
Financial 
Possibilities of 
Establishing an 
Independent Nuclear 
Force’ 
Hidetake 
⑫ ‘A Study of Changes 
in Nuclear Strategy 
and Japan’s Security’ 
January 
1969 
Sugihara 
Masami 
Minshushugi 
Kenkyukai 
87 
⑬ ‘Uranium 
Enrichment in Our 
Country’ 
July 1969 Kakihana 
Hidetake 
Unknown 45 
⑭ ‘Major International 
Issues in Nuclear 
Energy Development’ 
July 1969 Uematsu 
Kunihiko 
Unknown 36 
⑮ ‘Opinions of Scholars 
Regarding the 
Handling of the NPT’ 
November 
4, 1969 
Unknown Unknown 29 
⑯ ‘Basic Research on 
Japan's Nuclear 
Policy (Vol. 2): The 
Strategic, Diplomatic, 
and Political Issues of 
January 
1970 
Kanamaro 
Society 
Royama 
Michio 
Minshushugi 
Kenkyukai 
28 
an Independent 
Nuclear Force’ 
⑰ Changes in China’s 
Nuclear Development 
and Future 
Predictions’ 
February 
1970 
Miyawaki 
Mineo 
 
Unknown 62 
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